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INTRODUCTION 
The historical model of companies obtaining patents in order to 
practice them and business competitors asserting their patents 
against each other has been transformed.  Much more frequently, 
patent owners are commercially exploiting their patents through 
licensing and litigation, rather than practicing the underlying 
inventions.  By far, the most prevalent example of this can be seen 
 
  Ahmed J. Davis is a Principal in the Washington, D.C. office and Karolina Jesien is 
an associate in the New York office, respectively, of Fish & Richardson P.C.  The views 
expressed in this piece are those of the authors alone and should not be ascribed or 
attributed to the Firm or any of its clients.  This article developed from a talk given at 
made at the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, and Entertainment Law Journal‘s 
2011 Symposium entitled ―IP Bullying or Proactive Enforcement?‖ 
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in the rise of non-practicing entities (NPEs), otherwise known 
pejoratively as patent trolls.
1
 
A patent troll is an entity that focuses solely on capitalizing on 
patent portfolios.
2
  The troll purchases or otherwise obtains patents 
from other companies for purposes of licensing and enforcing 
them, rather than practicing any inventions covered by those 
patents.  NPEs may acquire patents from companies that are 
bankrupt, those that no longer practice the patents they own, or 
those that are seeking revenue from enforcement but lack sufficient 
capital to do so on their own.
3
  A typical business model for an 
NPE is to acquire patents that apply broadly across a particular 
industry (often business method patents), identify potential 
infringers, threaten litigation, and then either collect license fees 
from those entities or bring lawsuits against those that refuse to 
license.
4
 
Litigating through trial is usually the last resort.  An NPE‘s real 
objective in bringing suit is to pressure defendants into early 
settlements.
5
  In patent cases, the threat of a permanent injunction 
historically loomed large because, until relatively recently, 
injunctions were virtually guaranteed against an adjudged 
infringer.
6
  In cases where NPEs join large numbers of defendants, 
even modest settlements per defendant quickly add up, 
 
 1 For the purposes of this article, the terms ―patent troll‖ and ―NPE‖ will be used 
interchangeably, even though some NPEs may not necessarily be considered patent trolls 
(e.g. universities, failed companies, individual inventors).   
 2 In 2001, NPEs brought approximately one hundred lawsuits targeting five hundred 
operating companies, while in 2010, the numbers increased to more than five hundred 
lawsuits targeting over 2,300 operating companies. See Litigations Over Time, PATENT 
FREEDOM, http://www.patentfreedom.com/research-lot.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2012) 
(reporting data obtained as of January 9, 2012).     
3  Vaikhari Rajkumar, The Effect of Patent Trolls on Innovation: A Multi-Jurisdiction 
Analysis, 1 INDIAN J. INTELL. PROP. LAW 33, 35–36 (2008), available at 
http://www.commonlii.org/in/journals/INJlIPLaw/2008/3.html.  
4  See id. at 34 (defining a patent troll as ―[a] company or business function whose 
primary business activity is to acquire patents for the purpose of offensively asserting 
them against other companies.‖). 
5  See id. at 34–35.  
6  Id. at 38. (―[A] general rule had developed such that virtually automatic permanent 
injunctions would be issued against any party that was found to have infringed a 
patent.‖).  
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contributing to the troll‘s ―war chest‖ and allowing them to 
perpetuate the practice.
7
 
Many critics view the patent system as having failed the 
practicing entity and true research and development (R&D) 
organizations by allowing trolls to exploit defects in the system.  A 
recent Boston University study asserts that patent trolls have cost 
innovators over $500 billion in lost wealth over the last two 
decades.
8
  Since trolls have little incentive to reach cooperative 
business resolutions given that they do not compete in the 
marketplace with the alleged infringers, companies effectively are 
left with two options: take a license to the patents being asserted or 
litigate.  A troll‘s ability to extract high settlements by playing on 
the defendants‘ fears of permanent exclusion from the market has 
been viewed as a deterrent to innovation.
9
  The troll has power 
under the monopoly granted by a patent, it is said, to pull the plug 
on an entire operation and possibly drive a (small) company 
entirely out of the market.
10
  Because trolls are non-producing 
entities, they are immune from infringement countersuits and the 
coincident bargaining for cross licensing agreements. 
What‘s more, trolls often litigate on a contingent fee basis, 
which makes them less vulnerable to litigation costs than the 
companies they are suing.  This leaves defendants with high 
exposure but little bargaining power, which can result in high 
settlements for trolls, even if the asserted claims are of dubious 
validity; due to high litigation costs and the high risk to the 
 
 7 See, e.g., Why Use Acacia: Typical Arrangement with Patent Holders, ACACIA 
RESEARCH GRP. LLC, http://www.acaciaresearchgroup.com/whyuse.htm (last visited Feb. 
25, 2012).  Acacia has been labeled ―the mother of all patent trolls.‖ Gene Quinn, Mother 
of All Patent Trolls, Acacia Research, Gets More Funding, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 10, 2010 
2:10 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/08/10/patent-trolls-acacia-researchfunding/ 
id=12017/.  
 8 James E. Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs 
of Patent Trolls 4 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-45 (Sept. 19, 2011) 
(Revised November 2011), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship 
/workingpapers/documents/Bessen-Ford-Meurer-no-11-45rev.pdf (―Aggregating the 
change in market capitalization over two decades, we find that the aggregate loss of 
wealth to these firms exceeds half a trillion dollars.‖). 
9  Rajkumar, supra note 3, at 36.   
10  See, e.g., id. at 35 (discussing Pangea Intellectual Properties, a California company 
that ―sent letters to hundreds of small businesses seeking licensing fees of $25,000 on 
average.‖).  
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practicing entity, settlements tend to occur at the early stages of 
litigation, before the issue of validity of the claim is even reached.  
Patent trolls thus are in a unique position that enables them to 
negotiate licensing fees that are often grossly out of proportion to 
the contribution they have made to making products or providing 
services.
11
 
In response to the abundance of criticism, the patent system is 
moving towards effectively responding to systemic concerns raised 
by patent troll practices.  While the marketplace creates incentives 
for trolls to monetize patents, these are being counterbalanced by 
the Courts and the legislature, albeit at a slower rate.  Over the last 
few years, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have stepped in 
with rulings aimed at limiting some of the abusive tactics used by 
NPEs in patent litigation.  Congress also has enacted legislation 
targeted specifically at patent trolls and by committing to study the 
effect of the new law on troll behavior. 
I. BASICS OF PATENT RIGHTS 
The Constitution grants Congress the power ―[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries . . . .‖12  Congress has used this power to 
give inventors ―the right to exclude others‖ from practicing the 
inventions underlying their patents.
13
  Thus, contrary to general 
belief, a patent grant is not a right to practice an invention per se 
but rather a right to exclude others from practicing it.  Thus, 
Congress gave the inventor—as well as his heirs or assigns—the 
 
 11 For example, one of the highest settlements came from Research In Motion (RIM), 
the provider of the BlackBerry, which was sued in 2001 by NTP, an NPE entity, alleging 
that the BlackBerry infringed on several of its patents. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in 
Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Following a jury verdict of 
infringement, the trial court issued a permanent injunction, which was stayed pending 
appeal to the Federal Circuit.  The threat of shutting down BlackBerry service to over six 
million subscribers forced RIM to settle the lawsuit for $612.5 million. See Ian Austen, 
BlackBerry Service to Continue, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2006, at C6, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE1DA1431F937A35750C0A9609C
8B63. 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 13 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). 
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choice of enforcing a patent or electing not to enforce it, or 
alternatively licensing or selling it to another for enforcement.  
There can be little doubt that, even if unintended, the ―heirs or 
assigns‖ includes patent trolls.  Some view them as pariahs and 
others as vultures, but there is a case to be made that even vultures 
play a role in a well-functioning society.
14
 
When Abraham Lincoln stated in 1859 that ―the patent system 
added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius,‖15 he likely did not 
envision the system that currently exists.  In the 1800s, there was a 
notion that patent rights were granted to those who would 
contribute to the greater good by increasing the public store of 
knowledge, ultimately making something useful.
16
  But the benefit 
afforded patentees was to recognize and encourage innovation.
17
  
Almost two hundred years later, patent trolls have come along and 
changed the game by monetizing patents in a different way, but in 
a way that spurs innovation no less. 
While a patentee/inventor essentially holds a limited monopoly 
for a time, issuance alone does not realize the economic potential 
or economic benefit of a patent.  A patent needs to be enforced to 
be monetized.  If the cost of enforcement is too high, the market 
dictates that the patent owner will either not take steps to enforce 
the patent or will sell or license the patent to another entity that has 
the resources to enforce it.
18
  By creating this incentive to 
exchange goods and maximize profits, the market has helped 
patents evolve from mere exclusionary instruments into assets that 
have value. 
This is evidenced by the recent high settlements (e.g. the RIM 
settlement mentioned earlier), high monetary awards for 
 
 14 See, e.g., Bessen et al., supra note 8, at 6; Patent Thickets and Patent Trolls, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://volokh.com/posts/1241494164.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 
2012).  
15  OECD-BMBF WORKSHOP ON GENETIC INVENTIONS, IPRS, AND LICENSING 
PRACTICES, THE PATENTABILITY OF GENETIC INVENTIONS IN EPO PRACTICE (2002), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/27/1820221.pdf 
16  See Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600-1836: How Patents Became 
Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 183–91 (2004), available at 
http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2450&context=llr. 
17  See id. 
18  See generally Anupam B. Jena & Tomas Philipson, Cost-Effectiveness as a Price 
Control, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 696 (2003).  
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infringement, and high price tags paid for patent acquisitions.  In 
June 2011, the Supreme Court upheld a $290 million award against 
Microsoft in a patent dispute brought by a Canadian software 
company, i4i Limited Partnership, claiming that Microsoft Word 
infringed its patent.
19
  Also in June 2011, Canadian 
telecommunications equipment maker Nortel Networks sold more 
than 6,000 patent assets to an alliance made up of Apple, 
Microsoft, and other technology companies for $4.5 billion.
20
 
The question is: why is this problematic?  Given that we live in 
a society that is based on a free market, the market ought to correct 
itself if troll activity presents a problem.  In fact, there is a 
plausible argument that troll activities make the market more 
efficient by dealing with the enforcement and licensing processes 
and allowing inventors to focus on inventing.  It could also be 
argued that trolls actually foster innovation by providing liquidity 
and ensuring that independent inventors are compensated for their 
inventions.  In reality, the courts and Congress take the opposite 
perspective, responding to the troll situation through rulings and 
legislation that curb those troll practices that are viewed as 
problematic. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT STEPS IN 
One of the most significant changes to the patent troll 
landscape is the Supreme Court‘s ruling in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC.
21
  Until eBay, permanent injunctions were 
virtually guaranteed in patent cases.
22
  This provided patent trolls 
with a very powerful tool and enabled them to extract large 
settlement payments from practicing entities, for which the threat 
 
 19 Adam Liptak, Microsoft Loses Appeal in $290 Million Patent Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 10, 2011, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/business/10biz 
court.html?_r=1.  
 20 Chris V. Nicholson, Apple and Microsoft Beat Google for Nortel Patents, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (JULY 1, 2011, 8:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/ 
apple-and-microsoft-beat-google-for-nortel-patents/.  
 21 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 22 W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(―Although the district court‘s grant or denial of an injunction is discretionary depending 
on the facts of the case, injunctive relief against an adjudged infringer is usually 
granted.‖) (internal citations omitted). 
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of being enjoined was too great to risk.  In 2006, the Supreme 
Court expressly rejected the Federal Circuit‘s articulation of ―‗a 
general rule,‘ unique to patent disputes, ‗that a permanent 
injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been 
adjudged.‘‖23  The Court made clear that patent owners, like 
everyone else, must satisfy the traditional four-factor test
24
 to get a 
permanent injunction, including irreparable harm, a difficult factor 
for an NPE to prove. 
The eBay decision shifted significant leverage away from 
NPEs, as practicing entities have less incentive to settle early in the 
case because there is no longer the threat of a looming injunction.  
Especially where they can economically sustain a monetary 
damages award, practicing entities may be more likely to continue 
litigating and see cases through to the merits.  The Supreme 
Court‘s awareness of the patent troll issue is evidenced in Justice 
Kennedy‘s concurring opinion in eBay, where he recognized that 
―[a]n industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a 
basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for 
obtaining licensing fees.‖25  Justice Kennedy acknowledged that 
―[f]or these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious 
sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a 
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to 
buy licenses to practice the patent.‖26 
Courts have continued to grant injunctions in patent cases after 
eBay, but only within the proper framework.  In applying the four-
factor test, for example, courts are considering whether the 
plaintiff is competing in the marketplace with the accused 
infringer, thus exhibiting a more stringent treatment of NPEs over 
 
 23 eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94 (citing Mercexchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 24 Id. at 391.  
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.. 
Id. 
 25 Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 26 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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companies that actually practice their patents.  Indeed, courts are 
more likely to find irreparable harm and inadequacy of monetary 
damages, and thus issue an injunction, where parties are 
competitors.
27
  On the other hand, when parties do not compete 
and the patentee has a history of licensing the patent, courts are 
less likely to issue an injunction because monetary damages are 
likely sufficient.
28
 
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT STEPS IN 
The Federal Circuit has also taken a more active role in 
tailoring precedent to the changing legal landscape with respect to 
trolls.  In recent years, we have seen developments in the areas of 
willfulness, declaratory judgments, venue, and fee-shifting that 
indicate an acknowledgement by the court that it has a role in 
balancing the rights of practicing entities against patent trolls. 
A. Willful Infringement and Enhanced Damages 
The Federal Circuit has significantly altered the standard 
governing willful infringement and limited the circumstances for 
awarding enhanced damages.  In rejecting the previous ―duty of 
care‖ willfulness standard, the Federal Circuit in In re Seagate held 
that ―proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages 
requires at least a showing of objective recklessness‖; that is, ―a 
patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.‖29  Once this 
standard is satisfied, the patentee must further show that ―this 
objectively-defined risk . . . was either known or so obvious that it 
should have been known to the accused infringer.‖30  This decision 
works against patent trolls in two ways.  First, it lowers the risk of 
 
 27 See Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int‘l, Inc., 2008 WL 928496, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008) (―Courts routinely find irreparable harm, and therefore grant 
permanent injunctions where, as here, the infringer and the patentee are direct 
competitors.‖). 
 28 See generally, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. 
Tex. 2006) (finding that licensing company did not demonstrate irreparable harm and that 
any harm could be remedied by monetary damages). 
 29 In re Seagate Techn., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 30 Id. 
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a finding of willful infringement by the accused infringer.  Second, 
it also lowers the possibility that a judge or jury will award 
enhanced damages against an accused infringer.  This is 
significant, on the heels of the eBay case, because it further curtails 
the leverage that trolls have historically exerted against practicing 
entities. 
B. Declaratory Judgment 
Another way the Federal Circuit has singled out patent trolls is 
in lowering the standard for a case or controversy that arises in 
declaratory judgment contexts.  In Hewlett-Packard v. Acceleron, 
Hewlett-Packard (―HP‖) sued a patent holding company for 
declaratory judgment of non-infringement after it received a letter 
from Acceleron to ―call [HP‘s] attention to‖ a patent acquired by 
Acceleron and asking for ―an opportunity to discuss this patent‖ 
with HP.
31
  After Acceleron disregarded HP‘s proposal of a mutual 
standstill agreement, HP brought the declaratory judgment suit.  
The Federal Circuit found that Acceleron‘s actions were sufficient 
to support a declaratory judgment action, a decision which the 
court recognized ―undoubtedly marks a shift from past declaratory 
judgment cases.‖32  Most notably, the court ―observe[d] that 
Acceleron is solely a licensing entity, and without enforcement it 
receives no benefits from its patents.‖33  The court explained that 
―[t]his adds significance to the fact that Acceleron refused HP‘s 
request for a mutual standstill,‖ and held that, based on the facts of 
the case, ―when viewed objectively and in totality,‖ there was a 
―definite and concrete dispute between HP and Acceleron,‖ thus 
giving rise to declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
34
  This holding 
suggests a lower bar for declaratory judgment jurisdiction when 
the patentee is a patent holding company. 
C. Transfer 
The Federal Circuit also has limited another tool used by patent 
trolls to gain an advantage over practicing entities—venue.  A 
 
 31 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 32 Id. at 1364. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
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common tactic used by trolls has been to bring suits in the 
patentee-friendly Eastern District of Texas against large numbers 
of defendants that are scattered throughout the country such that 
there is no other venue that could be more convenient for the 
majority of the defendants.  More often than not, the NPEs have no 
real ties to the Eastern District of Texas but it is a desirable forum 
for patent holders.  Over the past two years or so, the Federal 
Circuit has taken notice and has been removing cases filed by trolls 
out of Eastern District of Texas via writ of mandamus, 
notwithstanding the extraordinary nature of such a request. 
For example, in April 2011, the Federal Circuit granted a 
petition for writ of mandamus sought by forty-one defendants (all 
in the finance industry) that were sued for patent infringement by 
Realtime Data, LLC, an NPE headquartered in New York.
35
  The 
petitioners had moved to transfer the case to the Southern District 
of New York where the plaintiff and twenty-seven defendants were 
located.  Similarly, in November 2010, the Federal Circuit granted 
Microsoft‘s petition for a writ of mandamus from an order denying 
a motion to transfer a patent infringement lawsuit brought by 
Allvoice Developments.
36
  Allvoice, a licensing company based in 
the United Kingdom, incorporated in Texas sixteen days before 
filing the suit and opened an office in Texas even though it did not 
employ any individuals in that office, or anywhere else in the U.S. 
for that matter.  Also in November 2010, the Federal Circuit 
granted Oracle Corp.‘s petition for writ of mandamus to vacate the 
denial of a motion to transfer the patent infringement suit filed by 
the patent holding company Financial Systems Technology (Intell. 
Property).  Despite the parties having previously entered into an 
agreement that identified the Eastern District of Texas as the venue 
for future litigation between them, the Federal Circuit held that the 
district court‘s reliance on this fact alone in denying transfer was 
plainly incorrect as a matter of law.  These are only a few of a long 
line of recent cases in which the Federal Circuit has ordered a case 
to be transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas to a more 
 
 35 In re Morgan Stanley et. al, Misc. Nos. 962, 964, 967, 2011 WL 1338830, at *1 
(Apr. 6, 2011). 
 36 See In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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convenient forum.
37
  The impact of these decisions removes a 
typical arrow from the trolls‘ quiver, creating a more level playing 
field between patent trolls and the practicing entities should the 
cases ultimately make it to a jury trial. 
D. Exceptional Case 
In a clear expression of disdain for the practice of patent trolls, 
the Federal Circuit on July 29, 2011 unanimously upheld a finding 
of an exceptional case and awarded $489,000 in attorney fees and 
$141,000 in Rule 11 sanctions in a patent infringement suit 
brought by Eon-Net, a patent holding company, against Flagstar 
Bancorp.
38
  The finding was based on Eon-Net‘s litigation 
misconduct, lack of pre-filing due diligence, and the filing of a 
baseless litigation in bad faith.
39
  The court found that ―Eon-Net 
acted in bad faith by exploiting the high cost to defend complex 
litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement from Flagstar.‖40  
The court specifically pointed to the fact that Eon-Net had ―filed 
over 100 lawsuits against a number of diverse defendants alleging 
infringement of one or more patents from the Patent Portfolio,‖ 
and that ―[e]ach complaint was followed by a ‗demand for a quick 
settlement at a price far lower than the cost of litigation, a demand 
to which most defendants apparently have agreed.‘‖41  In addition, 
the court criticized Eon-Net for ―the ability to impose 
disproportionate discovery costs on Flagstar . . . at least in part, 
because accused infringers often possess enormous amounts of 
potentially relevant documents that are ultimately collected and 
produced.‖42  Further, ―Eon-Net placed little at risk when filing 
suit [because] [a]s [an NPE], Eon-Net was generally immune to 
counterclaims for patent infringement, antitrust, or unfair 
competition because it did not engage in business activities that 
 
 37 See, e.g., In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re 
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Genentech, Inc., 
566 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1317 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 38 Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 39 Id. at 1326–28. 
 40 Id. at 1327. 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id.  
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would potentially give rise to those claims.‖43  Although it was 
based on a specific set of facts, this decision could put patent trolls 
at risk of facing significant litigation penalties for engaging in the 
traditional business model of filing numerous lawsuits and 
demanding quick settlements. 
While this specifically relates to trolls, at least one Federal 
Circuit judge has advocated the importance of bi-lateral application 
of this provision to patent ―grasshoppers‖ as well as trolls.  In his 
September 2011 ―State of Patent Litigation‖ address to the Eastern 
District of Texas Judicial Conference, Chief Judge Rader 
explained that both sides have the responsibility to police 
themselves and that fee-shifting would go a long way to advancing 
that goal: 
Every ―troll‖ discussion, however, needs a note of 
balance.  Just as trolls litter the patent system with 
marginally meritorious lawsuits, so the system also 
suffers from the IP ―grasshopper‖ [which is] the 
entity that is quick to steal the ―inventor-ant‘s‖ 
work and research investment [and] refuses to pay 
any license fee until his legs and claws are held to 
the proverbial litigation fire . . . A grasshopper is 
any entity which refuses to license even the 
strongest patent at even the most reasonable rates.  
Frankly, I am not sure who causes more meritless 
litigation—the troll asserting patents beyond their 
value or the grasshopper refusing to license until 
litigation has finally made it impossible to avoid.
44
 
As Judge Rader articulated, a ―fullscale reversal‖ of fees and 
costs would go a long way to remedial treatment of litigation 
abuses. 
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 
In view of the threat that eBay caused to the traditional patent 
troll business model, the hottest current battleground between trolls 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation, E.D. Texas Judicial 
Conference (2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/files/raderstateofpatentlit.pdf. 
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and practicing entities is at the United States International Trade 
Commission (ITC), a federal agency that adjudicates allegations of 
intellectual property infringement to determine any impact on 
domestic industry.  The ITC has the authority to issue exclusion 
orders that direct U.S. Customs to stop infringing products from 
entering the U.S. and to issue cease and desist orders against 
importers and others that engage in unfair competition.
45
  Because 
the ITC is an administrative agency granting remedies under 19 
U.S.C. § 1337 and not the Patent Statute, the Supreme Court‘s 
eBay holding does not apply.  Thus, although there are no 
monetary damage awards available, the threat of an exclusion 
order prohibiting importation of a particular good can be very 
effective in driving settlements from practicing entities. 
The current hot issue at the ITC relates to what qualifies as a 
―domestic industry.‖  In April 2010, the ITC held that the litigation 
costs incurred while enforcing patents in multiple district court 
lawsuits, which result in patent licenses, are enough to qualify as a 
domestic industry.
46
  But the Federal Circuit has already stepped in 
and imposed some limitations on this holding.  In Mezzalingua 
Associates, Inc. v. ITC, the Federal Circuit affirmed an ITC ruling 
that the appellant did not satisfy the ―domestic industry‖ 
requirement under 19 U.S.C. § 337(a)(3)(C), which provides that 
the requirement is satisfied when there is ―substantial investment 
in [the patent‘s] exploitation, including engineering, research and 
development, or licensing.‖47  According to the Federal Circuit, a 
single license granted for the asserted patent by the appellant, and 
the years of litigation costs leading up to the execution of the 
license, were not sufficient to satisfy the domestic industry 
requirement because the costs were not all incurred with the 
objective to obtain a license (other objectives included obtaining 
an injunction) and, as a result, the investment in licensing was not 
 
 45 What the USITC Is . . . and Isn’t, U.S. INT‘L TRADE COMM‘N, http://www.usitc.gov/ 
press_room/gen_info.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
 46 Certain Coaxial Cable Connectors and Components Thereof and Prods. Containing 
Same, Investigation No. 337-TA-650 (ITC Apr. 14, 2010) (public version), available at 
http://thepriorart.typepad.com/the_prior_art/2010/ITC.650.decision.pdf.pdf.  
 47 John Mezzalingua Assocs., Inc. v. Int‘l Trade Comm‘n, 660 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
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―substantial.‖48  Although this ruling likely will not affect licensing 
companies incurring substantial litigation costs, it could have an 
effect on smaller-scale licensing companies and NPEs that have 
few licensing deals but high litigation costs. 
V. CONGRESS ENACTS THE AIA 
There can be little doubt that Congress had NPEs in mind when 
it passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which was 
signed into law by President Obama on September 16, 2011.  
Section 34 of the AIA expressly provides that ―[t]he Comptroller 
General of the United States shall conduct a study of the 
consequences of litigation by [NPEs], or by patent assertion 
entities, related to patent claims made under title 35, United States 
Code, and regulations authorized by that title.‖49  Such a study 
―shall‖ include ―[t]he economic impact of such litigation on the 
economy of the United States, including the impact on inventors, 
job creation, employers, employees, and consumers‖ and ―[t]he 
benefit to commerce, if any, supplied by [NPEs] or patent assertion 
entities that prosecute such litigation.‖50 
The most immediate impact on NPEs will be newly added 35 
U.S.C. § 299 (Section 19 of the AIA), limiting joinder in a single 
suit of unrelated parties.  As already mentioned, it has become 
common for NPEs to file patent infringement actions against large 
numbers of defendants with little in common in terms of their 
industry or the products or services they provide.  As part of this 
tactic, NPEs select defendants located throughout the U.S. and not 
concentrated in any particular area, such that there is no single 
venue convenient for the majority of defendants.  Some courts 
have been more tolerant of this tactic than others, one example 
being the patentee-friendly Eastern District of Texas, where juries 
are also likely to award generous damages.  Whereas allowing for 
joinder of multiple defendants in a single action had been intended 
to serve to enhance efficiency in litigation where certain factual 
 
 48 Id. at 1341. 
 49 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29 § 34(a), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 50 Id. at § 34(b)(5) and (6). 
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questions were shared among all defendants, the NPEs have used 
this tool as a means to force defendants to act collectively and 
inhibit each defendant‘s ability to protect its own interests on its 
own terms.  The AIA appears to have taken this advantage away 
from the NPEs. 
The new section 299 provides that in a patent infringement 
action,  
parties that are accused infringers may be joined in 
one action as defendants or counterclaim 
defendants, or have their actions consolidated for 
trial, or counterclaim defendants only if—(1) any 
right to relief is asserted against the parties jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or 
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences relating to the 
making, using, importing into the United States, 
offering for sale, or selling of the same accused 
product or process; and (2) questions of fact 
common to all defendants or counterclaim 
defendants will arise in the action.
51
   
Indeed, section 299 requires that there be another basis for joinder 
beyond an allegation that all defendants have infringed the same 
patent: ―accused infringers may not be joined in one action as 
defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have their actions 
consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations that they each 
have infringed the patent or patents in suit.‖52  It also appears that 
Congress has recognized that there exist circumstances where 
defendants may find strength in large numbers and an ability to 
achieve efficiencies through cooperation, and has accordingly 
provided defendants with an option to waive the requirements of 
Section 299.
53
 
As a practical effect, NPEs will no longer be able to capitalize 
on economies of scale and will likely be forced to file as many 
patent infringement lawsuits as there are defendants.  This means 
 
 51 Id. at § 19.  
 52 35 U.S.C. § 299(b) (2006).   
 53 35 U.S.C. § 299(c) (―A party that is an accused infringer may waive the limitations 
set forth in this section with respect to that party.‖).   
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that each lawsuit will likely be filed in (or ultimately transferred 
to) the venue where each defendant has its principal place of 
business or is organized.  The new law greatly reduces the 
efficiencies that NPEs had created by asserting a single patent 
against a laundry list of defendants.  More importantly, however, 
the new law will cause the validity of the asserted patent to be 
placed at risk every time the patent is asserted. 
It is also clear that Congress does not necessarily believe that 
its work is done with respect to the troll situation.  The AIA 
requires the Comptroller General to submit, one year after the 
enactment of the AIA, a report with the results of the study 
mentioned above ―including recommendations for any changes to 
laws and regulations that will minimize any negative impact of 
patent litigation that was the subject of such study.‖54  Thus, 
Congress appears to anticipate that further changes to the patents 
laws and regulations may be needed down the road, depending on 
the effect that the AIA will have on NPEs.  This is at least an 
indication that Congress is keeping a close eye on the practices of 
NPEs and their economic impact, and that it will continue to 
modify the law as change becomes necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite criticism of the patent system in the context of patent 
troll concerns, the law is moving inexorably to where it needs to 
be.  There is a tradeoff occurring—the NPEs file the cases and 
Congress and the courts are stepping in where necessary.  The 
reality is, and the market dictates, that patent trolls will continue to 
find ways to navigate the patent laws in an attempt to monetize 
patents.  But recent decisions of the Supreme Court and Federal 
Circuit, and the America Invents Act that was recently passed by 
Congress, provide stronger tools for targets to attack and/or protect 
themselves against patent trolls. 
 
 
 54 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29 § 34(c), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in section of 35 U.S.C.) (emphasis added).   
